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I
INTRODUCTION
This article offers a model of the nature, sources, and extent of the
president's power to interpret the Constitution. The model is grounded in a
theory of constitutional law that seeks to unify the two great systems of U.S.
fundamental law, the system of rights and the system of structure.
t
As discussed in the body of this article, unified theory supplements the
existing analysis of presidential power in two ways. First, unified theory suggests
the utility of cross-fertilization between the systems of rights and structure-of
importing the value of liberty from the system of rights and applying it to the
system of structure, and likewise, of importing the principle of checks and
balances from the system of structure and applying it to the system of rights.
Second, unified theory suggests the possibility of devising broader concepts that
apply to both systems. Energy in government and the avoidance of faction are
two overarching concepts in my version of unified theory.
Unified theory raises subtle problems with respect to the president's power
of constitutional interpretation. One cannot say that the president has plenary
power to interpret the Constitution, nor can one say flatly that the president's
power of interpretation is subject to the overriding power of the federal courts,
or of Congress. Instead, the nature and extent of the president's power of
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Theory, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 196 (1991), reprinted in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS (Ellen Frankel Paul
et al. eds., 1991)[hereinafter Constitutional Theory]. For an analysis of the concept of the unitary
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constitutional interpretation depends on the issue being addressed and the
particular political and procedural context in which the question arises.
This area of constitutional law and practice is murky, but it may be possible
to identify some of the relevant considerations. Among these are the following:
Energy in Government. As an incident to the value of energy in govern-
ment,2 the president enjoys a power of interpretation flowing from the duty to
execute the laws. The president cannot execute laws, including the law of the
Constitution, unless the laws are interpreted; in many cases the president has no
choice but to interpret the Constitution independently, without guidance from
the Supreme Court or anyone else. Thus, the executive power necessarily
includes a power of legal interpretation that does not depend on the vesting of
judicial power in the Supreme Court under Article III of the Constitution.'
The scope of the president's power of interpretation also depends, in part, on
whether the issue at hand involves situations where the value of energy in
government is strongly implicated, such as domestic lawlessness or threats from
foreign powers. When domestic lawlessness or foreign threats are present,
energy in government supports broader presidential interpretive powers.
Conversely, when domestic lawlessness or foreign threats are absent, energy in
government does not support broad interpretive powers.
Faction-Avoidance. Unified theory also favors constitutional arrangements
that limit the influence of political factions on U.S. public life. Thus, the
president's interpretive powers should be constrained to limit the influence of
such groups. The president should enjoy relatively broad powers to interpret the
law in a fashion that checks the power of special interest lobbies, but only a
relatively narrow scope of discretion to interpret the law so as to enhance special
interest power.
Liberty. Unified theory limits the president's interpretive powers when the
issue endangers individual liberties-either liberties of the person or rights of
property. Therefore, the president should favor interpretations that tend to
protect individual liberties over interpretations that tend to undermine them.
Checks and Balances. Finally, the principle of checks and balances under
unified theory suggests that the president enjoys broader interpretive flexibility
when the issue in question does not implicate the powers of other branches. If,
on the other hand, the president's decision directly affects the powers of
Congress or the Supreme Court, the president should narrowly interpret
constitutional provisions that favor executive authority, and broadly interpret
constitutional provisions that limit executive authority vis-A-vis the other
2. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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branches. This article refers to this maxim as the principle of deferential
interpretation.
The principle of deferential interpretation has a variety of more specific
implications. When power relations with the federal courts are implicated, the
president's interpretive flexibility largely depends on whether the federal courts
have developed doctrine on the matter. If the matter is one of first impression,
the president enjoys relatively broad interpretive flexibility. If, however, the
federal courts have established settled rules, the president's interpretive
discretion is more limited. The constraints on presidential interpretive authority
also depend on the identity of the courts that have addressed the question.
Greater deference is owed to the Supreme Court than to lower federal courts.
The extent to which the courts have definitively settled the question is also
relevant: greater deference is owed to a case directly on point than to one which
differs in significant respects from the matter at issue.
The president's power of interpretation also depends, in part, on whether or
not the matter arises in litigation. The president enjoys significant freedom when
presenting constitutional arguments to a federal court. Under the system of
checks and balances, it is then the court, not the president, that ultimately makes
judicial decisions. Once a federal court has ruled, however, and all avenues of
higher review have been exhausted, unified theory suggests that the court's
judgment binds the president, except in unusual cases in which the integrity of
the nation is threatened.
When the president interprets the Constitution outside the litigation context,
the president should ordinarily defer to settled judicial interpretations, since,
given the court's role as impartial decisionmaker and protector of individual
liberty, settled interpretations are likely to protect individual liberties and to
reduce the influence of faction. However, unified theory would allow the
president to reject such interpretations if he or she concludes that doing so is
necessary to protect citizens against domestic expropriation or violence, or to
conduct foreign affairs or military operations. If the president does reject a
settled judicial interpretation and the matter is thereafter tested in court, the
president would ordinarily be bound, as described above, to respect a final
judgment of the federal courts even if the judgment is contrary to the president's
own views.
The principle of checks and balances under unified theory also suggests some
inferences about presidential interpretive authority vis-A-vis Congress. The scope
of the president's authority to interpret the Constitution should be relatively
greater with respect to proposed legislation than with respect to enacted
legislation. Just as the president has very broad authority to present his or her
own view of the Constitution to a court for its decision, he or she also has wide-
ranging powers to object to proposed legislation on constitutional grounds. With
respect to enacted legislation, however, the president should conclude that a
provision is unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable by the executive
branch, only when there are strong reasons, such as a compelling need to protect
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individual liberties, conduct foreign affairs, or safeguard the national defense, for
rejecting the judgment of Congress.
Finally, unified theory may have some bearing on the question of whether
the president has authority to bind himself or herself, or subsequent presidents,
to particular interpretations of the Constitution. The president has more
flexibility in interpreting the Constitution if the matter is one of first impression
for the executive branch than if there exist prior pronouncements from
responsible executive officials.
For the most part, the interpretive principles set forth in this article are
consistent with reasonable intuitions: most people would agree, for example, that
the president should not ordinarily disobey a direct mandate of the Supreme
Court in a case properly within the Court's jurisdiction. Similarly, most people
would probably agree that the president has greater powers to interpret the
Constitution in matters relating to foreign affairs or national defense than he or
she has in cases involving purely domestic issues. The other principles set forth
above, explored in greater detail below, also seem to accord well with sensible
intuitions about the scope of the president's authority to interpret the Constitu-
tion. The theory's general consistency with reasonable intuitions is an advantage
of unified theory over other models, which tend to yield less-modulated results,
and which are often at odds with reasonable intuitions.4
The body of this article consists of three parts. Part II addresses some
defects of prior theoretical work on this area. Part III describes the nature and
implications of a unified theory of constitutional law. Part IV argues that unified
theory provides a valuable articulation of the president's rights and obligations
in this complex and important area of fundamental law.
II
THEORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Before discussing a unified theory of presidential constitutional interpretation,
it is useful to consider the strengths and weaknesses of alternative theories. As
will be seen, a noteworthy feature of many of these theories is their absolutism:
They tend either to accord the president virtually unfettered discretion on
questions of constitutional interpretation, or rigidly to circumscribe the
president's interpretive powers within Supreme Court jurisprudence. There are
few, if any, existing theories that provide a satisfying account of the limits of
presidential interpretive authority while, at the same time, remaining consistent
with reasonable intuitions about these problems.5 Further, existing theories
suffer from the defect that they usually consider only the impact of judicial
decisions on the scope of presidential interpretive authority. While this problem
is no doubt fundamental, an adequate theory of presidential interpretive power
4. See infra notes 8-35.
5. On consistency with reasonable intuitions, see JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTicE 48-51
(1971) (reflective equilibrium).
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should also address other considerations that may have little to do with the
power relations between the president and the federal judiciary.
A. The Absolutism of Existing Theories
A principal defect of existing theories is that they tend to fall down one or
the other of two slippery slopes. The executive supremacist school recognizes
a nearly unfettered power of presidential interpretation, while the judicial
supremacist school strictly requires the president to follow the interpretations set
forth by federal courts.6
1. Judicial Supremacists. Judicial supremacists probably represent the majority
view among U.S. legal academics. Their position, broadly speaking, is that the
president must treat U.S. Supreme Court decisions as authoritative in the same
way a lower federal court judge would treat such decisions. The judicial
supremacy position is grounded in the view that the Supreme Court is the final
authority in our system on the meaning of the Constitution.7 A corollary,
perhaps not logically entailed but nevertheless usually assumed, is that the
president also owes deference to lower federal court decisions, especially those
by federal courts of appeals. The president's obligation under this corollary is
analogous to the duty which one lower federal court owes to treat as persuasive,
if not authoritative, the opinions issued by other lower federal courts.
Judicial supremacists have focused particular attention on the problem of
nonacquiescence-the executive's refusal to acquiesce in the decisions of inferior
federal courts Commentators such as Joshua Schwartz9 and Matthew Diller
and Nancy Morawetz ° claim that executive branch nonacquiescence violates the
principle of separation of powers," arguing respectively that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Crowell v. Bensen 2 and Cooper v. Aaron13 foreclose
executive nonacquiescence power. Daniel Coenen, in a more recent article, uses
a means-ends test drawn from the system of individual rights to argue against a
presidential power of nonacquiescence, on the ground that nonacquiescence
6. Not all scholars have fallen into this trap, however. See David Strauss, Presidential Interpretation
of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113 (1993).
7. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
8. For a thoughtful treatment, see Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE LJ. 679 (1989); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The
Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE LJ. 831 (1990).
9. Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77
GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989).
10. Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule
of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 821-28 (1990).
11. Commentators have also argued against nonacquiescence under the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause. However, the real substance of the critique, if there is one, is the structural
question of separation of powers. See Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1352-57 (1991).
12. 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (Constitution limits congressional delegations of judicial power to non-Article
III tribunals).
13. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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intrudes on separation of powers values, and that the justifications advanced in
support of nonacquiescence are insubstantial.14
Despite the popularity of the judicial supremacist view, its justifications are
often perfectly circular. According to this view, the judiciary has final
interpretive authority over the Constitution because the Supreme Court said so
in Cooper; or because the Court held in Crowellf6 that the Constitution limits
congressional delegations of judicial power to non-Article III tribunals;17 or
because it intoned in Marbury v. Madison"s that "[it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." But saying
doesn't make it so.
The Constitution itself does not subordinate the president to the courts in
matters of constitutional interpretation. On the contrary, the text and structure
of the Constitution establish the president as head of a coordinate branch of the
government.19 Moreover, it is perfectly clear that the president must interpret
the law as an incident to enforcing it. Interpretation is not the unique province
of the judicial branch.2' Deciding issues properly raised in litigation is the
judicial branch's special role, but there is nothing in this function that is
inconsistent with an autonomous presidential power of constitutional interpreta-
tion.
The history of checks and balances is also inconsistent with the notion of
judicial supremacy in interpretation. At the time of the framing of the
Constitution, the independent judiciary was an idea of recent origin. It is
virtually inconceivable that the Framers intended the president to be subservient
to the judiciary on matters of constitutional interpretation outside the litigation
context.21 Consider also the great importance which early Congresses accorded
to issues of constitutional interpretation in debates on legislation,22 or that early
presidents brought to bear on their decisions to veto or sign bills presented to
14. Coenen, supra note 11, at 1387.
15. This is essentially the position taken by Diller & Morawetz, supra note 10, at 821-28.
16. 258 U.S. 22.
17. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1835-43.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1390 ("If more is needed to
make the case against intracircuit nonacquiescence, it is supplied by Marbury v. Madison.").
19. See Strauss, supra note 6.
20. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Cr. REV. 41, 66.
21. See Miller, Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 212, n.44.
22. The congressional deliberations on the bill to establish the first Bank of the United States
provide a case in point. See generally BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 115-16 (1957).
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them by Congress.' The case for judicial supremacy in constitutional interpre-
tation, in short, is not established.
2. Executive Supremacists. Judge Frank Easterbrook advances a powerful
case for the independence of executive interpretation.24 He notes there that
there is a long tradition of presidential action based on constitutional views,
including views that differ from those of the courts.'
Professor Thomas Merrill offers a different justification for presidential
autonomy in interpretation. His view is based on "coherentist" considerations,
which "rest more comfortably within the general warp and woof of American
public law."'26 Professor Merrill attacks the notion that judicial opinions are
"law" binding on the president, citing a number of coherentist grounds: (1) the
idea is difficult to square with language used by the courts themselves; (2) judges
sometimes recognize that Supreme Court opinions are not the same as the
Constitution itself; (3) judicial opinions are not thought of as modifying or
amending law, even when they change accepted understandings; and (4) the
courts' own rule of stare decisis is not nearly as absolute as the rule of res
judicata in a particular case.27
Although the executive supremacy arguments of Easterbrook, Merrill, and
others are powerful and well reasoned, they suffer from objections nearly as
serious as those that plague the judicial supremacy argument. If the president
has fully autonomous powers to interpret the Constitution, why should he or she
be subject to judicial decrees in actual cases?' More fundamentally, complete
executive autonomy would so seriously undermine the authority of the federal
judiciary as an autonomous branch of government that the basic premises of the
separation of powers would be threatened.
Historically, the practice of presidents has been contrary to the executive
supremacy view. Although presidents have occasionally asserted their authority
to interpret the Constitution in a manner inconsistent with judicial precedent,29
23. Again, the disputes over the first and second Banks of the United States provide classic
examples. President Washington treated the constitutional questions attending the bill establishing the
first Bank of the United States with enormous gravity. See generally HAMMOND, supra note 22, at 117-18
(President Washington took all the time allowed under the Constitution to consider the legislation sent
to him for approval, "in anxious and diligent inquiries into the constitutionality of the bill and in the
consideration of his duty in relation to it."). President Andrew Jackson also focused heavily on
constitutional arguments (albeit with different result) in deciding to veto the bill extending the life of the
second Bank of the United States. See id. at 405.
24. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1989-90). See also
John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and
Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992). Former Attorney General Edwin Meese made
similar arguments, and provoked a storm of controversy, in Edwin Meese, II, The Law of the
Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987).
25. Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 906-11.
26. Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. Cr. REV.
225, 240.
27. See id.
28. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 123-25.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 85-99.
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actual exercises of this power have been exceedingly rare.' When presidents
disagree with the constitutional decisions of federal courts, they appoint new
judges, endorse constitutional amendments to overturn disfavored decisions, or
flog the decisions from the bully pulpit of the White House.31  But they
ordinarily do not take actions inconsistent with prevailing precedents. When the
president asks his or her Attorney General for an opinion on the constitutional-
ity of a particular measure, the Attorney General cites judicial opinions. 2 By
the same token, members of Congress cite judicial opinions when a dispute arises
in Congress on the constitutionality of proposed legislation. The other branches
of government act as if the opinions of the federal judiciary have special priority
in the interpretation of the Constitution, a view that is nearly universally shared
by persons outside the government.
3. Professor Paulsen's Dilemma. Is there any way out of the dilemma of
judicial versus executive supremacy? Professor Paulsen 33 argues that this black-
and-white quality of existing theory is a necessary feature of any adequately
developed theory of executive branch interpretation. "The premises supporting
the two polar positions," Paulsen writes, "pose a sharp dilemma, forcing the
principled interpreter down one slippery slope or the other."'  Paulsen argues,
in short, that there is no middle ground. A principled interpreter of the
Constitution is inevitably driven toward one of the two polar positions, either
judicial supremacy or executive supremacy. If Paulsen is right, then his theory
precludes approaches such as the unified theory presented in this article, which
claim that executive interpretive power depends on the circumstances of the case
and the nature of the issue involved.
Professor Paulsen's position is ultimately unpersuasive, however, because it
does not take account of unified theory values. When unified theory values are
not considered, it becomes difficult, as Professor Paulsen observes, to avoid
falling into one or the other of the extreme positions. As I argue below,
however, when unified theory values are taken into account, a strong theoretical
case can be made for an intermediate position that denies supremacy either to
the executive or the judiciary over matters of constitutional interpretation.
Moreover, in demonstrating the deficiency of existing theories, at least when
measured against a standard of reasonable intuitions, Professor Paulsen in fact
30. Occasionally, Presidents have been willing to claim less by way of interpretive authority. See
Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993).
31. Presidential adherence to judicial precedent, of course, also owes much to the practicalities of
governing. For an insightful discussion, see John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 371 (1988).
32. The Attorney General cites these opinions, not as merely persuasive or analogous authority-as,
for example, when the courts of one state cite decisions by courts of other states-but as, in some sense,
authoritative.
33. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 81 (1993).
34. Id. at 83.
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provides a powerful argument for the application of unified theory, which
permits the development of a modulated view of executive judicial interpretive
power without using ad hoc exceptions or theoretical inconsistencies as devices
for avoiding executive or judicial absolutism.a5
B. The Failure of Existing Theory to Recognize Internal Constraints on
Presidential Interpretation
Existing theories suffer from a problem equally fundamental as their
tendency toward absolutism. The heavy focus on executive-judicial conflict tends
to obscure the fact that nonjudicial tensions may also profoundly affect
presidential authority to interpret the Constitution.
Presidents are empowered to interpret the Constitution whether or not their
interpretations conflict with prior pronouncements of federal courts. Indeed,
presidents and members of Congress must often interpret the Constitution on
issues not addressed by courts in litigation. Lincoln understood this responsibili-
ty and concluded that, as a Senator, he would vote to enact a fugitive slave law,
however distasteful that measure was to him personally, because he believed it
compelled by the Constitution.' A complete theory of presidential constitu-
tional interpretation should take account of all the limits on presidential
interpretive authority, including limits that stem from sources other than a
perceived tension with the judicial branch. As will be discussed below, unified
theory offers a satisfying account of presidential interpretive authority both
within and without the context of litigation. In this respect, unified theory enjoys
advantages over other theories.
III
TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The theory set forth here is one example of the unified theories that have
developed in the past few years. Although there are many differences between
them, this article refers to them as "unified theories" because they all seek to cut
across traditional rights-structure boundaries of constitutional law and resolve
questions which had previously been separated in theory. Besides myself, other
scholars working in the area include Akhil Amar, a7 Rebecca Brown," Stephen
35. See infra text accompanying notes 75-105.
36. See PAUL M. ANGLE, CREATED EQUAL? THE CoMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF
1858 304 (1958). Lincoln's reasoning is discussed in Albert W. Alschuler, Holmes' Scholarship: Mr.
Hyde Defines Law (manuscript on file with the author).
37. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193
(1992) [hereinafter Bill of Rights 1]; Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131
(1991).
38. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513 (1991).
A UNIFIED THEORY
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes,3 9 Mary Ann Glendon and Raul Yanes,4  and
Michael McConnell.41
The basic premise underlying unified theories is that we do not have two
Constitutions, one devoted to questions of rights and one devoted to structure.
Therefore, constitutional law should not follow two separate systems of
interpretation. The systems of rights and structure have co-existed since the
beginning.
The Constitution of 1787 was principally a structural document. The Framers
had greater confidence in checks and balances than in parchment barriers as a
safeguard of ordered liberty. Nevertheless, the Ex Post Facto Clauses,42 the Bill
of Attainder Clauses, 43 the prohibition against suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus,44 the Contracts Clause,45 the Treason Clauses,' the Privileges and
Immunities Clause,4 7 the Republican Form of Government Clause,' and the
Oath or Affirmation Clause49 are all elements of the system of rights built into
the original constitutional design. The Bill of Rights introduced a full-blown
system of rights into the Constitution. Yet the Bill of Rights, although it sounds
primarily in rights, also contains the important structural feature of the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves powers to the states and the people not delegated
to the federal government.5
Later amendments to the Constitution include both structural and rights-
based provisions. Among these are the various protections of rights contained
in the Reconstruction Amendments,51 the structural features found in the
Eleventh Amendment's restriction on federal court jurisdiction in lawsuits
involving states,52 and the grants of enforcement powers to Congress under
various later amendments.53
Because we have a system of fundamental law that includes both rights and
structure, a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution might look to both
39. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1155 (1992).
40. See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1991).
For subsequent comments by Professor Glendon on unified theories, see Mary Ann Glendon, The
Common Law and the Written Law, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (Terry 0.
Eastland ed., 1993); Mary Ann Glendon, Comparative Law as Shock Treatment: A Tribute to Jacob W.
F. Sundberg, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR JACOB SUNDBERG (Erik Nereys ed., 1993) (forthcoming).
41. Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship
Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REv. 267 (1988).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
43. Id. § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
44. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
45. Id. § 10, cl. 1.
46. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1-2.
47. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
48. Id. art. IV, § 4.
49. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
50. Id. amend. X.
51. Id. amends. XIII-XV.
52. Id. amend. XI.
53. Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, § 2; id. amend.
XXIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2.
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systems in resolving particular constitutional questions. In general, this has not
been done. Instead, constitutional law focused on one system or the other,
without much attempt to unify the two.
During the nineteenth century, especially during the antebellum period,
structural considerations dominated, with relatively little attention being paid to
questions of rights.' During the present century, the focus has shifted toward
an emphasis on rights: property rights during the Lochner era," and personal
liberties during more recent years.
Recently, the Supreme Court has returned to questions of structure, although
maintaining primary emphasis on rights.56 With this change has come increased
attention to the importance of structural issues in constitutional interpretation,
leading to the development of the unified theories described above.
There are two main elements in my version of a unified theory of constitu-
tional law. The first element is cross-fertilization. Under this element, the
constitutional analyst imports the core values of the system of structure into the
analysis of rights, and the core values of the system of rights into the analysis of
structure.
As discussed in my earlier work,57 liberty is the principal value of the system
of rights. Under unified theory, cross-fertilization mandates that questions of
constitutional law be evaluated in terms of their impact, or probable impact, on
individual liberties.
The focus on individual liberty is not problematic in the area of rights: In
evaluating the scope of permissible warrantless searches under the Fourth
Amendment, for example, it would be inconceivable for constitutional analysts
to ignore the probable impact of the governing rule on the liberties of individuals
to be secure in their persons, papers, or effects.
Cross-fertilization extends this analysis by requiring that considerations of
individual liberties be applied in structural cases. 58 In evaluating whether it is
proper, under Article III of the Constitution, to vest the adjudication of common
law claims in an administrative tribunal, for example, it would be appropriate for
a constitutional analyst to consider whether the particular features of the federal
judiciary-life tenure, salary protections, and the status of a branch of
government with equal dignity in the constitutional design-make federal judges
54. It is no accident that a leading constitutional law treatise of the period was Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1868).
55. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
56. Leading structural decisions include Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding
the organization of the United States Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 914 (1986) (invalidating provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); Immigration
and Naturalization Services v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating exercise of a legislative veto of
executive action).
57. Miller, Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 202-09.
58. Justice Scalia recognized this point in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers ... and of the unitary executive ... was not
merely to assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom .... ).
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more likely to protect individual liberties than administrative officers who do not
enjoy these protections5 9
This question is inherently difficult to answer and depends on predictions and
inferences about how particular features of a position are likely to affect official
behavior. However, the issue is no more difficult, and no more empirical, than
many questions of constitutional law that constitutional analysts routinely
address. For example, courts consider the likelihood that the exclusionary rule
will deter police misconduct;' the chilling effect on truthful speech of a rule
making private figures liable for defamation upon a lesser showing of fault than
actual malice;61 or the magnitude of the threat to religious liberties created by
a municipality's creche display during the Christmas season.62 Empirical issues
under unified theory are not different in kind or degree.
Cross-fertilization also requires analysts to apply structural considerations in
individual liberty cases. In evaluating questions arising under the system of
rights, the constitutional analyst appropriately gives principal emphasis on the
degree to which a given rule would affect individual liberties. But structural
issues may be involved as well. Sometimes structural issues are thinly veiled
beneath the surface of issues arising under the system of rights. For example,
questions of whether a particular constitutional right under the Bill of Rights is
incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment are ostensibly
questions of rights, but the resolution of these questions necessarily involves the
delicate issue of the respective powers of the states and the federal govern-
ment-a pure question of structure.63  Or the question may be whether
Congress has the power, under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to expand the substance of constitutional rights beyond what the
Supreme Court has recognized.'M Again, the precise point at issue in the case
59. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding statute
empowering an administrative agency to adjudicate common law counterclaims of the sort ordinarily
determined by courts of law, and rejecting contention that such authority intruded impermissibly on the
constitutional powers of the federal courts); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 47-51 (1932) (construing
Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act narrowly to avoid an unconstitutional
infringement of federal judicial power by administrative agencies).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (recognizing a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Bill of Rights is inadmissible in state criminal trials).
61. See, e.g., Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163-69 (1979) (holding that individual
once convicted for failure to appear before a grand jury is not a public figure); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (holding that ex-wife of corporate executive is not a public figure); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-49 (1974) (holding that lesser standard than actual malice applies
to private figure plaintiffs in defamation cases, but plaintiff must still show fault to recover).
62. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a nativity scene on
the main staircase of a county courthouse violated the establishment clause); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984) (holding that in the context of a seasonal display, a creche located in the heart of the city's
shopping district did not violate the establishment clause).
63. See generally Bill of Rights I, supra note 37, at 1194.
64. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive
Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1982); Archibald Cox, Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966); William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).
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may involve individual rights, but the broader underlying issues sound in
structure-here, the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court in
the definition of constitutional rights.
In other cases, the structural implications of an issue are less obvious.
Nevertheless, all questions of individual rights implicate structural concerns.
Even an issue that appears to arise solely within the domain of rights-for
example, whether under principles of equal protection, Congress can constitu-
tionally bar women from combat duty in the military-raises important
structural issues. If the Supreme Court is asked to decide the case, the Court's
willingness to determine the issue in the first place is itself an important
structural decision. The implicit assertion of the power to decide the issue may
seem unproblematic in light of today's jurisprudence, where Marbury v.
Madison' is an unquestioned bedrock of constitutional law, but it nevertheless
is not clearly established by the text of the Constitution itself. Even assuming
the basic power of judicial review, it remains unclear whether the Court should
have the power to adjudicate this particular question of constitutional law,
implicating as it does important interests of national defense policy that might
best be left for determination by the "political" branches. Even if the Court may
appropriately decide this particular issue, the question remains whether the
particular congeries of interests involved requires a preference rule for or against
a particular result. For example, it might be the case, from a structural point of
view, that the Court should defer to the judgment of the political branches on
issues of national defense policy even if it decides to enter the dispute.
Whichever way the Court decides this issue, it is clear that the degree of
deference which it accords to the decisions of a coordinate branch of government
is an important matter of structure.
These various structural considerations playing beneath the surface of
individual rights jurisprudence can be summed up in the idea that the principle
of checks and balances may appropriately be imported into the area of rights.
The basic value served by the system of structure is the principle that the
awesome powers of government are appropriately divided and directed against
one another in such as way as to ensure that all power does not accumulate in
a single hand, the condition which the authors of the Federalist Papers defined
as the "very definition of tyranny."'67 Thus, in addressing issues of rights, it is
appropriate in each case for the constitutional analyst to consider the implica-
tions which a particular decision-including, importantly, the decision to decide
the matter in the first place-has for the constitutional structure of checks and
balances. If a decision threatens to unsettle the balance of powers among the
branches of government, and in particular if it threatens to place essentially
uncheckable powers in the hands of any one branch, then this is a reason to
65. Cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding against an equal protection challenge
a federal statute authorizing the president to require men (but not women) to register for the draft).
66. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
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favor a different outcome. Again, it may be very difficult, as a practical matter,
for an analyst to determine whether a decision in a given case does or does not
threaten the principle of checks and balances; but, as before, this decision,
however complex and uncertain, is not different from the kinds of decisions that
analysts face routinely in all areas of constitutional law. There appears to be no
reason in principle why the analyst could not consider the impact on checks and
balances of a particular decision in the area of rights, just as the analyst would
do without a second thought if the question at hand arose under the system of
structure.
So far I have discussed the first level of analysis under unified theory-that
of cross-fertilization. Unified theory also recognizes another, more general set
of considerations that transcend the rights-structure boundary. The Constitution
was intended as a document that would survive across generations; one of the
pervasive themes of the Federalist Papers was that the government established
by this new fundamental law must be durable enough to survive the many threats
which imperil all systems of social organization.' As analyzed in the Federalist
Papers, the overriding interest in durable and stable government involves two
fundamental values.
First, the authors of the Federalist Papers emphasized the absolute necessity
that the government be endowed with the power to protect persons and property
against violence or expropriation by others. It is for this reason, indeed, that
government was established in the first place. If people were angels, we would
not need government; but because people are not angels, and because they will,
if given the opportunity, commit violence against others, or expropriate others'
wealth, it is necessary that the people establish a collective authority with the will
and the ability to prevent such violence and expropriation. The Federalist Papers
refer to this quality as energy in government. 69 The new government to be
established by the Constitution was to be an energetic government; as such it was
endowed with the authority to provide for the common defense against foreign
aggression and to protect the domestic tranquility against the risk of insurrections
or other private lawlessness.
At the same time, the virtue of energy in government is not unalloyed. In
establishing a government and vesting it with sufficient energy to protect against
foreign aggression or domestic lawlessness, the people also subjected themselves
to the danger that the government would utilize this power, not for their
protection, but rather to abuse them. The authors of the Federalist Papers
expressed this danger of governmental abuse through the concept of faction-
avoidance. The abusive faction could be a minority of the people which obtains
control over the government and, like a criminal clique, uses its powers to
68. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 89-92 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
69. See, e.g., id. at 92 ("... the necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one
proposed, to the attainment of this object [of preserving the union and ensuring political prosperity].")
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advance their own interests,70 or such a faction could be comprised of an
aroused majority of the public which, inflamed by passions or prejudice, uses the
powers of government to commit violence or expropriation against a minority.71
The authors of the Federalist Papers view factions of either sort as a severe
threat to legitimate government, and advance a number of devices or mecha-
nisms of republican government as protections against this threat. 2
Taken together, the concepts of energy and faction-avoidance suggest a
fundamental formula for optimal governmental design. The problem is to design
a government which minimizes the sum of two costs: (1) the cost of private (or
foreign) expropriation, violence, and oppression, and (2) the costs of governmen-
tal expropriation, violence, and oppression. The fundamental argument of the
Federalist Papers is that the structure of government invented by the delegates
at the Constitutional Convention was well suited to minimizing the sum of these
costs and, thus, to solving the optimization problem.
Unified theory uses these twin concepts of energy in government and
avoidance of faction as overarching criteria for evaluating particular issues of
constitutional law. An interpretation of the Constitution is to be preferred if it
permits the government sufficient energy to combat the threat of private or
foreign expropriation, oppression, or violence. As I have argued elsewhere, the
principle of energy in government can be understood as giving a constitutional
dimension to the government's interest in law enforcement. This change in
perspective has implications for a number of areas of constitutional law,
especially constitutional criminal procedure.73 Similarly, the concern for energy
in government would appear to counsel for broad governmental powers,
especially executive powers, in the areas of foreign affairs, military operations,
and national security policy.
The other overarching principle, that of faction-avoidance, also plays a role
in unified theory. Other things equal, an interpretation of the Constitution is to
be preferred that reduces the threat that a faction or coalition of factions will
obtain disproportionate governmental powers and use those powers to oppress
others or expropriate their wealth. Thus, in interpreting an issue arising under
either the system of rights or the system of structure, the constitutional analyst
should properly ask whether a particular resolution will increase the influence of
faction in public life. The preferred interpretation is that which best protects
against the danger that a faction or factions will obtain undue influence over the
decisions or processes of government.
It should be emphasized that, despite the possible appearance of grandiosity,
the claims of unified theory are in fact quite modest. Unified theory presents
itself, not as a usurper of traditional constitutional interpretation, but rather as
a supplement. The developed bodies of interpretation under the system of rights
70. The former communist governments in Eastern European are a classic case in point.
71. This threat is a very real possibility, or a reality, in some Eastern European countries today.
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 124 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
73. See Miller, Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 222.
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and the system of structure remain fully applicable and valid within the
framework of unified theory. Unified theory merely supplies considerations in
addition to those offered by existing jurisprudence. Unified theory might change
outcomes in some cases and, in others, might provide reasons for greater
confidence in results reached through the application of traditional doctrine. At
other times, its role could be seen as that of a tie-breaker: unified theory might
tip the scales in favor of one result when the application of conventional doctrine
leaves the constitutional analyst in equipoise. Thus, unified theory offers modest,
but useful, input into constitutional analysis.
Unified theory may, however, have a greater role to play in areas where
constitutional doctrine is particularly murky or unsatisfactory. The question of
presidential power to interpret the Constitution is such an area. There are few
cases relating to this issue and the application of traditional constitutional theory
does not yield determinate results. As has been seen, theories other than unified
theory tend to produce outcomes that are unacceptably extreme, either in favor
of unfettered presidential authority or in favor of presidential subservience to the
judicial branch. In the area of presidential interpretation of the Constitution,
unified theory may have a particularly useful role to play.
IV
A UNIFIED THEORY OF PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
This article now addresses the implications of unified theory for the
president's power of constitutional interpretation,74 beginning with some general
propositions about the nature of the executive function, moving on to a
discussion of the principles of liberty, checks and balances, energy, and faction-
avoidance, and discussing in some detail several problems of presidential
interpretive authority vis-A-vis the other branches. It also discusses the
president's power to deviate from prior presidential interpretations.
A. The Nature of the Executive Function Includes the Power to Interpret the
Constitution
The proposition that the president's power to execute the law includes a
power of interpretation should be universally accepted. The executive is charged
with carrying out the law enacted by the (legislature or by another legitimate
law-creating body such as a constitutional convention). But carrying out the law
74. This problem is rendered more complex by the fact that the president himself or herself is only
an individual, or the head of a relatively small office, with only a few direct constitutional powers. Many
of the important questions of constitutional interpretation will arise in connection with the operations
of the sprawling bureaucracy, which includes administrative agencies enjoying various degrees of
ostensible independence from direct presidential oversight and control. See generally Miller, supra note
20. The question of how much power the president properly can exercise over the law-interpretation
function of the administrative state is one of considerable complexity. I have attempted to address that
question in other recent work, see Unitary Executive, supra note 1, and for purposes of the present article
will sometimes pretermit these questions by referring to the interpretive powers of the president only.
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is not a mechanical task; it inevitably involves matters of judgment and analysis.
To execute the law, the president must determine what the law means; and to
determine what the law means, he or she must engage in interpretation.75 The
principle of energy in government would be vitiated if the president were
deprived of the authority to interpret the law as an incident to enforcement. The
existence of a presidential power of interpretation should not be controversial;
what is in dispute is the nature and extent of that power, especially in cases
where the president's views on the meaning of the Constitution conflict with the
views of some other agency of government.
B. The President's Power of Interpretation Is Broader When the Issue
Relates to Foreign Affairs, Military Policy, or Domestic Law
Enforcement
In addition to identifying an independent source of interpretive authority in
the president, the principle of energy in government suggests considerations as
to the proper use of that authority. As we have seen, energy in government is
needed to combat the threat of private or foreign expropriation and violence
against persons or property.76  Where this threat is present, therefore, the
principle of energy in government justifies a broad power in the president to
interpret the Constitution in such a way as to ensure that the government is
powerful enough to carry out its responsibilities.' Thus, the president's power
of constitutional interpretation is broader when the issue relates to foreign
affairs, military policy, or domestic law enforcement. The president's interpretive
powers are correspondingly narrower when the principle of energy in govern-
ment is not strongly implicated.
C. The President Should Interpret the Constitution to Protect Individual
Liberties
The principle of liberty, when considered under unified theory, suggests that
the president should be constrained to favor interpretations of the Constitution
that protect individual liberties. Identifying these interpretations may be a
relatively complex matter. It may sometimes be the case that a decision in a
given case will impair the liberty of one individual, while enhancing the liberties
of others. Despite occasional difficulties of determining which interpretation will
favor individual liberty, a general preference for liberty-enhancing interpretations
appears workable and seems to fit well with reasonable intuitions about
constitutional values.
75. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) ("[I]n performance of assigned
constitutional duties each branch of the government must initially interpret the Constitution."); Miller,
supra note 20; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,
15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43 (1993).
76. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
77. The principle of liberty, however, operates as a check on presidential authority if the
justification of energy in government seriously threatens individual liberties.
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D. The President Should Interpret the Constitution to Reduce the Danger of
Faction
The principle of faction-avoidance also provides guidance about the proper
scope of presidential constitutional interpretation. The president should favor
the interpretation of the Constitution which appears most conducive to reducing
the influence of faction in public life.
Consider the line-item veto. Presidents Reagan and Bush persistently sought
line-item veto authority, largely for budgetary reasons.78 The constitutional text
does not preclude a line-item veto. However, the president's attorneys at the
Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the Constitution does not permit the
president to exercise this power.79 The result may be correct under the
principle of deferential interpretation because it represents a narrow reading of
the Constitution in a situation where a broad reading would have greatly
enhanced the president's powers vis-A-vis the Congress.
A relatively strong argument, however, could have been developed in favor
of line-item vetoes. Few forms of legislation are more faction-driven than
appropriations measures, and the line-item veto would provide the president with
the opportunity to reduce the influence of faction by rejecting pork-barrel deals
presented to him or her as part of general, essentially veto-proof legislation. The
line-item veto would send these measures back to Congress for reconsideration,
but the chances that the necessary majorities could be mustered to override
particular vetoes would generally be low, both because of the public attention the
veto would focus on the interest groups, and because the override legislation
would not enjoy the same opportunities for logrolling as existed in the initial
legislation. While it is true that the president could abuse the line-item veto in
furtherance of factional interests, the potential for increased factional activity the
line-item veto would introduce seems to be lower than the likely decrease in the
power of factions it would accomplish.'m There is no indication that the Office
of Legal Counsel addressed these considerations of faction-avoidance when it
issued its opinion, but a full analysis should have done so, even if the conclusion
that the president lacked line-item veto authority remained the same.
E. Presidents Have Broad Powers to Offer Constitutional Interpretations to
Courts in Litigation
The president enjoys broad discretion to offer interpretations of the
Constitution to federal courts in the context of litigation.81 When the president,
78. See Kmiec, supra note 30, at 353.
79. The opinion is not yet published, but it is described in id. at 353-59.
80. This position is not universally shared, however. For an argument that the line item veto is
subject to serious problems of faction, see Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States'
Item Veto be Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 190 (1986) (line item vetoes at the federal
level may exacerbate problems of logrolling).
81. For a contrary view, see Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40
VAND. L. REv. 389, 401 (1987).
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through the Solicitor General or other designated official, makes arguments to
the Supreme Court, the effect is not to enforce the law but merely to suggest
interpretations that the Supreme Court has discretion to accept or reject. This
view is somewhat controversial because of the wide-spread belief that the
Solicitor General is somehow special in the litigation process-that he or she is,
in Lincoln Caplan's arresting if inaccurate phrase, a "tenth Justice." 82 While it
may seem obvious that the president and his or her subordinates in the
Department of Justice have special responsibilities to interpret the Constitution
responsibly when making arguments to the Supreme Court, I believe the actual
situation is different. The role of the Solicitor General appears to impose special
interpretive responsibilities only when it is forgotten that the president always
has significant constraints on his or her interpretive discretion, both within the
context of litigation and without.83
F. Presidents May Disobey the Mandates of Federal Courts Only in
Extraordinary Circumstances
Once a federal court has decided a case and issued its mandate to the
executive branch, unified theory suggests that the president has no authority
directly to flout a mandate of a federal court in a case properly in its jurisdiction,
except, in the most unusual circumstances.
Presidential disobedience to a federal court order raises a number of red flags
in unified theory. For starters, it has extremely problematic consequences for the
principle of checks and balances. The power of a federal court to adjudicate
cases and controversies arising within its jurisdiction is one of the principal
checks in our constitutional system against the danger of excessive accumulation
of power in the hands of the president. If the president could ignore the
mandates that issue from such adjudications, on the ground that he or she
disagrees with the constitutional interpretations on which the adjudications are
based, the result would be a potential breakdown of the system as a whole,
because a fundamental check on self-interested behavior by the president would
be lost.'
82. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1987). Even former Solicitors General sometimes endorse the notion that their job carries a special
weight in interpretation that has a higher dignity than the president's general obligation to interpret the
Constitution in a responsible fashion. Reading between the lines, this appears to be one of the themes
of Charles Fried's interesting and provocative account of his tenure as Solicitor General in the Reagan
Administration. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991). For a critique, see John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The
Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992).
83. See ANGLE, supra note 36.
84. It should be noted that the danger of presidential disobedience to judicial directives is especially
problematic, from the standpoint of checks and balances, when the matter is one of constitutional
interpretation rather than statutory construction. If the matter is one of statutory construction, an action
by the president in refusing to comply with a judicial mandate, on the ground that the court has
misinterpreted the statute, can be trumped by congressional legislation clarifying the meaning of the
statute (the president, of course, could refuse to comply with such a trumping statute as well, but that
is a different matter, and essentially signals a breakdown of the constitutional system). When a question
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In addition to concerns under the rubric of checks and balances, the principle
of faction avoidance also counsels strongly against any presidential authority,
absent situations of national crisis, to disobey otherwise valid mandates of the
Supreme Court. Of all the agencies of the government, the Court is perhaps the
least vulnerable to the influence of faction. Because the Justices serve for good
behavior and enjoy salary protections, they need not account to any political
interest group for their behavior once on the Court. The Court, moreover, sits
en banc, a rule that tends to protect against the possibility that a particular
interest group will obtain disproportionate influence over its decisions. In a case
where the Supreme Court has come to a direct confrontation with the president,
it is more likely that the president, and not the Court, is serving the interests of
a particular faction.
On the other hand, the concern for maintaining energy in government
suggests that there may be extraordinary situations in which the president could
legitimately disregard an otherwise binding ruling by the Supreme Court. If the
Supreme Court, for example, issued a writ prohibiting the president as
Commander-in-Chief from protecting the Hawaiian Islands against attack from
a hostile foreign power-perhaps on the theory that a formal declaration of war
is necessary before any military action can take place-the president would be
justified in ignoring the writ and protecting United States territory against the
aggression. This action would not represent a breakdown in the constitutional
fabric, but rather an exercise of authority vested in the president to act, even
contrary to the Supreme Court, in cases of dire threat to the national security.
Because of the threat of factionalism and inappropriate accumulation of power
in the executive, this authority to ignore binding judicial judgments must, under
unified theory, be strictly limited to cases of imminent threat to the national
security. One need only consider the unfortunate history of other countries
which, although ostensibly ruled by written constitutions, have been governed for
extended periods by executive fiat under self-serving claims of national
emergency, to recognize the peril that attends any exercise by the president of
the power to ignore judicial judgments.
What, then, are we to make of the famous case about which Professor
Paulsen has written with such panache:' President Lincoln's refusal to honor
judicial process in Ex parte Merryman?' Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas
corpus at a time when Congress was out of session, and federal military officers
arrested and imprisoned numerous citizens believed to be secessionists.
Merryman, one of those detained, sought and obtained a writ of habeas corpus
from Chief Justice Roger Taney. The writ directed the commanding officer at
Fort McHenry to produce the petitioner, but the officer refused, citing the
of constitutional interpretation is involved, there is no course of action that Congress can take to change
the president's interpretation, or to resolve the constitutional confrontation, short of impeaching the
president or the members of the Court, or initiating the procedure for constitutional amendment.
85. See generally Paulsen, supra note 33.
86. 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
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President's order. Taney held the officer in contempt and ruled that President
Lincoln had no power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, since that power was
vested, in Taney's view, in Congress alone. Recognizing that his order would not
be enforced, Taney directed that the record of the proceedings be transmitted
to the President personally, leaving it to him, "in fulfillment of his constitutional
obligation to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' to determine what
measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be
respected and enforced." 87
Did Lincoln properly have the power, under unified theory, to disregard the
writ of the Chief Justice in Merryman? Arguably, unified theory can justify
Lincoln's action on the ground that, under the circumstances, the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus was a compelling necessity for the preservation of the
nation, notwithstanding the facts that the liberty of a citizen was being infringed
and that the President's action, if extended to other circumstances, potentially
undermined the principle of checks and balances. At the time Lincoln acted, as
documented by Professor Paulsen, the nation's capital was threatened by armed
secessionists, federal troops had been menaced by a mob in Baltimore, and
Lincoln himself had been forced to enter the capital surreptitiously.as In such
extraordinary circumstances, the President was arguably justified in suspending
the writ and in refusing to comply with Chief Justice Taney's arguably self-
interested decree." Indeed, Lincoln himself justified his actions in exactly these
terms. In a speech to Congress, Lincoln suggested that it was permissible, and
even constitutionally required, for the President to refuse to execute a law in
order that the government not be overthrown. 90
It does not follow, however, from the conclusion that Lincoln may have been
justified in ignoring Taney's decree in Merryman, that a president may willy-nilly
ignore binding federal court decrees. The fact that presidents have almost never
done so is a telling indication that the power to ignore a judicial decree is an
extraordinary authority available only as a last resort. The only other recorded
case of presidential nonacquiescence presents an instructive contrast. President
Jackson reportedly rejected the Supreme Court's decree in Worcester v.
Georgia,91 which held that federal treaties with the Cherokee Nation barred the
State of Georgia from exercising legislative jurisdiction over whites living in
Cherokee territory.92 If Lincoln was justified in Merryman, what of Jackson?
87. Id. at 153.
88. See generally Paulsen, supra note 33.
89. Taney was the author of the Dred Scott opinion which Lincoln, as President, had vowed to
resist.
90. See 4 Roy P. Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 431 (1953), quoted in Paulsen,
supra note 33 ("Would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when
it was believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?").
91. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
92. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 737
n.234 (1988).
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Initially, it should be noted that the procedural context in Worcester was
quite different from that in Merryman. The latter case involved a direct judicial
order to an executive official-and implicitly to the President-to take a
particular action on pain of contempt of court for nonacquiescence. Nothing of
the sort was presented in Worcester, which did not directly involve any executive
official at all. The order of the Supreme Court in that case merely purported to
nullify the actions of the State of Georgia in sentencing the plaintiff in error to
hard labor. It was the Georgia authorities, not the President, who flouted the
Court's decree.93
It could be said that the order of the Court was a law of the United States
or, alternatively, that the treaties involved were laws of the United States, which
the President had a duty to execute under the Take Care Clause.94 However,
the Take Care Clause cannot mean that the president has the duty to execute
every law of the United States without exception. Many laws go unexecuted all
the time, without anyone raising an objection. The Department of Justice
routinely overlooks violations of federal law under principles of prosecutorial
discretion. Executive agencies frequently fail to comply with time deadlines set
forth in environmental laws.' The situation in which the president has failed
to execute a law is quite different from one in which he or she has refused a
binding judicial order to take or refrain from taking a particular action.
In Worcester, for example, it would have been a different case if the plaintiff
in error, upon failing to obtain satisfaction from the Georgia authorities, had
obtained a writ of mandamus or other order from a federal court directing a
federal executive branch official to force his release from state custody. If such
an order had been obtained, and the President had directed that it be disobeyed,
the case would have been similar to Merryman. But President Jackson was never
placed under a binding obligation of this sort.' When Georgia refused to
release Worcester, he initially sought to bring the matter once again to the
attention of the Court, with the expectation that the Court would request that
the President enforce the mandate.' Worcester changed his mind, however,
and obtained a pardon from the Governor of Georgia, thus mooting the
controversy.98 President Jackson was never formally requested, much less
ordered, to enforce the decree. The Merryman power was never implicated.
It is evident, under principles of unified theory, that President Jackson would
have been acting unconstitutionally if he refused such a direct order in Worcester,
even if the President justified his action on the ground that he disagreed with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of applicable law. The concern for energy in
93. Id.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (President shall "take care that the laws be faithfully executed").
95. See, e.g., William V. Luneberg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An Overview of
Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988 WiS. L. REV.
1, 16.
96. For an account of the imbroglio, see WHrrE, supra note 92, at 737-39.
97. Id. at 738.
98. See id.
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government would not justify such an action, since there was no threat of
insurrection or imminent danger to national security, and the integrity of the
nation was not going to crumble if Georgia was denied legislative jurisdiction
over Cherokee lands within its borders. Moreover, the dangers of factionalism
were high in this case: Powerful interests in Georgia were seeking Cherokee
lands, and the Cherokees and their supporters, such as the plaintiff in error in
Worcester, a missionary from Vermont, were evidently politically powerless. The
concern for individual liberties also strongly counseled against President
Jackson's action, since the Georgia authorities had committed the plaintiff in
error to four years at hard labor for no other crime than preaching the gospel in
Cherokee territory without first obtaining a license and swearing allegiance to
the state.
Thus, the premises of unified theory suggest that Lincoln may well have been
correct in refusing Taney's decree in Merryman, but that Jackson would have
acted unconstitutionally if he had violated a judicial order to enforce Marshall's
judgment in Worcester. Unified theory permits a nuanced analysis of cases that
yields different results depending on the particular facts and circumstances,
results that seem to jibe with reasonable intuitions about outcomes.
G. Outside the Litigation Context, Presidents Should Generally Defer to
Settled Judicial Precedent
In other cases, the president or a subordinate will be asked to interpret the
Constitution before a case finds its way into court but in a situation where the
issue is susceptible to judicial review." Unified theory suggests that presidents
should generally defer to settled judicial interpretations unless there are strong
reasons to decide otherwise."° Settled judicial interpretations appear relatively
insulated from the dangers of faction. Although factions can influence courts
through lobbying on appointments, filing judicial briefs, or manipulating public
opinion, their influence on courts is probably less direct than is their influence
on the "political" branches. Thus, deferring to settled judicial interpretations
would tend to serve the unified theory value of faction-avoidance. Further, it
seems reasonable to conclude that settled judicial interpretations tend to be
liberty enhancing. Courts have a tradition of protecting individual liberties. The
nature of the judicial process, in which the affected individual receives equal
dignity as a litigant with the state, tends to correct for the imbalance of power
that might exist in the political arena. Thus, the value of liberty which is
fundamental to unified theory also counsels in favor of presidential deference to
settled judicial interpretations.
The implications of the two other principal elements of unified theory are not
as clear-cut. The principle of checks and balances suggests some reasons for
99. For a helpful discussion of this situation, see Strauss, supra note 6, at 115.
100. Here, because the President acts in the shadow of the courts, practical considerations also
counsel in favor of decisions congruent with existing judicial precedent.
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deference to settled judicial interpretations, but also some reasons for allowing
the president a significant degree of interpretive flexibility in situations where the
president's decision is reasonably susceptible to judicial review. In favor of
deference is the fact that the federal judiciary is an autonomous branch of the
government with no formal power other than the power to issue judgments
which would not mean much if they were restricted in effect to the narrow facts
before the court. The degree of deference owed to settled interpretations, under
the principle of checks and balances, would evidently depend on the nature of
the court involved, with the greatest deference owed to the Supreme Court and
the least to trial-level courts. Deference would also vary according to and on the
closeness of fit between prior judicial opinions and the facts before the president,
with greater deference owed in a case on all fours with prior decisions and less
deference owed in a case with significant factual differences.
On the other hand, the principle of checks and balances does not act
univocally in this context. If the issue is reasonably susceptible to judicial review,
the courts will probably have the opportunity to issue a judgment in the future,
thus placing the president in the position of defying an ostensibly binding
mandate of a court of competent jurisdiction if he or she wishes to adhere to the
original interpretation. Because the federal judiciary possesses the power to
check the president's action in the future, the president should enjoy somewhat
greater freedom of action, under the principle of checks and balances, than he
or she would otherwise. If the president's decision is not reasonably susceptible
to judicial review, the case for deference to settled judicial interpretations is
stronger because the courts will have no subsequent opportunity to reject the
president's interpretation.
The value of energy in government, however, could potentially justify a
president in refusing to adhere to a settled judicial interpretation. If the
president concludes that the government cannot effectively fulfill its mandate to
combat private expropriation and violence, or to safeguard national interests in
the arena of foreign or military affairs, then the president could, consistent with
unified theory, determine to repudiate a settled judicial interpretation. However,
because the other values of unified theory generally support presidential
adherence to settled judicial precedent, the president's power to ignore such a
precedent should be limited to situations where there are strong reasons to reject
the prior decisions.
H. The President Has Broad Discretion to Evaluate the Constitutionality of
Proposed Legislation, But in General Should Support the
Constitutionality of Enacted Legislation
The president must frequently interpret legislation or proposed legislation,
and in so doing must consider whether the legislation is constitutional. Where
the legislation is only proposed, the president owes little deference to its
constitutionality, since Congress as a body has not yet spoken and will have the
opportunity to consider the president's views when it does take up the proposal.
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In the case of enacted legislation, however, the situation is different. In general,
the principle of checks and balances suggests that the president should defer to
the legislative judgment that particular provisions are constitutional. This is an
application of the rule of deferential construction to avoid conflicts with other
branches. The president's obligation to enforce legislation despite constitutional
difficulties would appear to be stronger in cases in which Congress has given due
attention to the constitutional problems, and approved the legislation with full
awareness of the difficulties, than in cases where the constitutional problems
were overlooked or not carefully considered.
In some cases, however, unified theory would not call for as much deference
to the constitutionality of legislation. If the legislation in question trenches on
individual liberties, the president can properly draw on the principle of liberty
to interpret the legislation in a liberty-enhancing manner, or even to refuse
enforcement, if the president believes the measure violates some constitutional
protection of personal liberties or property rights. Similarly, if the legislation
deprives the president of powers to safeguard the national defense, conduct
military operations, or protect the public against domestic insurrection or
violence, the president need not defer to the congressional judgment that such
legislation is constitutional. 10 1  The president may not have to defer to
congressional judgments of constitutionality in the case of legislation that is
clearly designed to benefit one interest group at the expense of another, or of
the public at large."° In such a case, the principle of faction-avoidance justifies
a broader power of presidential interpretation than would otherwise be allowed.
Further, the president should enjoy stronger powers of interpretation when
legislation significantly encroaches on the president's constitutional authority.
While unified theory generally supports a rule of deferential construction in cases
in which the constitutional provision in question affects the rights and preroga-
tives of another branch of government, if the president concludes that the
Congress has itself intruded on executive prerogatives, the president should not
be disabled from protecting these prerogatives.0 3
101. A classic example is the War Powers Resolution, containing a number of measures which
presidents have opposed on the ground that they deny the president the necessary powers to commit
United States forces to armed conflict short of war. See generally Charles Bennett et al., Panel
Discussion, The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief versus Congress' War Power and
Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 17 (1988).
102. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. Cr. REv. 397
(federal filled milk legislation serving the special interest of the U.S. dairy industry).
103. The problem is similar to strategy of tit-for-tat in prisoners' dilemma games, under which a
player cooperates as long as the other player cooperates, and does not cooperate whenever the other
player does not cooperate. Tit-for-tat has been shown to be an effective strategy in iterated prisoners
dilemma games. See generally ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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I. Absent Substantial Reason, Presidents Should Adhere to Consistent
Executive Branch Precedent
If there is prior jurisprudence in the executive branch, the degree to which
the president is bound by prior interpretations should depend on the nature and
circumstances of the prior interpretation. The guiding rules here can be drawn,
perhaps, from the principle of energy in government. By binding himself or
herself with formal, public interpretations of the law, the president can actually
enhance the energy by which he or she enforces the law, because the president's
commitment to a particular interpretation provides notice to those who might be
the target of enforcement efforts as to what the president expects or does not
expect. If presidents changed their minds at random, or for reasons of whim or
caprice, the energy of the executive would arguably be decreased despite the
apparent increase in discretion that an unfettered power to change the law would
seem to imply. Thus, the principle of energy in government might impose limits
on the president's ability to deviate from an interpretation of the Constitution
previously issued by the executive branch.
The president cannot, however, be absolutely locked into prior interpreta-
tions. Changed conditions or unforeseen exigencies may demand a fresh look
at the problem, and new administrations need a reasonable degree of flexibility
to implement their own policies, free of strictures that may have been imposed
by potentially hostile former administrations.
The degree to which the president should be constrained in interpreting the
Constitution by prior executive branch pronouncements would appear to depend,
in part, on the nature of the prior interpretation. Formal interpretations by the
Attorney General or the Office of Legal Counsel probably should be given
greater weight than interpretations of other executive branch agencies because
the power to give legal opinions to the president has been, to a significant extent,
centralized in those offices. Interpretations by "independent" agencies should
also have force, although, as I argue in a different article,"° the degree to
which the president ought to be bound by the lawmaking of administrative
agencies is a much more complex question than the raw issue of whether the
head of the agency enjoys statutory protection against presidential removal.
Interpretations by former administrations are probably less authoritative than
interpretations by the current administration, although the principle of energy in
government suggests that presidents should not deviate from constitutional
interpretations issued by prior administrations unless there are good reasons to
do so.
104. See Miller, Unitary Executive, supra note 1, at 212-18.
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V
CONCLUSION
This article has addressed the president's power of constitutional interpreta-
tion from the standpoint of a unified theory of constitutional law. Unified theory
provides some guidance on this question that is not available in the existing
literature. The theory supports results that are generally consistent with
reasonable intuitions about the proper scope of presidential interpretive powers.
It does not fall into the trap of endorsing either absolute presidential powers or
absolute judicial powers, offering instead a modulated set of prescriptions that
vary depending on the circumstances under which the president faces a question
of constitutional interpretation. Unified theory, moreover, provides a relatively
comprehensive set of concepts that apply to many different interpretive settings,
including important settings in which the constitutional question is unlikely to
receive judicial attention.
While unified theory offers some advantages, this article does not present it
as any kind of panacea. Unified theory does not displace existing jurisprudence,
but rather operates only as a supplement. The result will usually be the same
after the application of unified theory as before. Moreover, as I have remarked
elsewhere, the concepts of unified theory are couched at such a high level of
generality as to make the application of the theory to particular fact settings
uncertain in many cases.1"5 Its concepts might prove indeterminate, or even
susceptible to result-oriented manipulation. While these are dangers, they are
not unique to unified theory. If unified theory suffers criticism from being too
general, it at least offers the hope of identifying sensible considerations for
constitutional analysts to examine when addressing difficult and perplexing issues
of fundamental law.
105. See Miller, Rights-Structure, supra note 1, at 223.
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